Abstract. We revisit Shin et al.'s leakage-resilient password-based authenticated key establishment protocol (LR-AKEP) and the security model used to prove the security of LR-AKEP. By refining the Leak oracle in the security model, we show that LR-AKE (1) can, in fact, achieve a stronger notion of leakage-resilience than initially claimed and (2) also achieve an additional feature of traceability, not previously mentioned.
Introduction
Authenticated Key Establishment protocols (AKEPs) allow two parties to share a secret key based on long-term secrets associated with individual entities (typically passwords). Passwords are strings easily memorized by humans and thus of low entropy. Such protocols are especially popular in computationally restricted devices and those requiring interaction with human users. For example, in practical applications, the secrets derived from passwords are stored in some devices (e.g., a table containing hashed values of passwords kept by a trusted server). A fundamental security threat for password-based AKEPs is, unsurprisingly, dictionary attacks due to low entropy of password-based AKEPs.
We revisit the leakage-resilient password-based AKEPs (LR-AKEPs), first proposed by Shin, Kobara and Imai [7] and subsequently extended in [4, [8] [9] [10] . LR-AKEPs, designed to maintain the secrecy of the long-term password even in the case when stored secrets (i.e., functions of the password) are leaked, can be broadly categorised into two families: the Diffie-Hellman-based LR-AKEPs [7] [8] [9] and the RSA-based LR-AKEPs [4, 10] .
Widely used security models for AKEPs (including password-based AKEPs) include the indistinguishability-based models of Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway [1] model (hereafter referred to as the BPR2000 model) and Canetti and ⋆ The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect those of any organisation with which the author may be affiliated. This research was undertaken in the author's personal capacity.
Krawczyk [2] 4 . In the BPR2000 model, leakages of established secret session keys and long-term secrets (e.g., private key or password) are considered by allowing the adversary to have access to the Reveal oracle and the Corrupt oracle respectively. To model leakage-resilience, Shin et al. [7] introduced an additional Leak oracle that allows the adversary to learn the stored secrets of unrelated sessions.
The focus of this paper is on the Diffie-Hellman-based LR-AKEP published in ASIACRYPT 2003 [7] (hereafter referred to as "the LR-AKE protocol"). A distinct difference between the LR-AKE protocol and latter extensions [8, 9] is that only one secret is stored on the client in the latter schemes.
We regard our contributions in this paper to be three-fold:
1. Revised security model: We refine the original model used by Shin et al. to prove the security of the LR-AKE protocol by splitting the Leak oracle into LeakC and LeakS oracles 5 . By so doing, we are able to define how many leakages occur on the server side. 2. Stronger notion of leakage-resilience than that defined by Shin et al.: Shin et al. proved that the LR-AKE protocol is secure when the leaks do not originate from both the client and servers simultaneously. We demonstrate that the LR-AKE protocol can, in fact, provide an almost perfect security level. 3. Notion of traceability not previously mentioned by Shin et al.: We demonstrate that the LR-AKE protocol can provide traceability, which allows us to identify the compromised client or server devices when leakages occur.
Revisiting the leakage-resilient AKE protocol of ASIACRYPT 2003
The notation used throughout this paper is as described in Table 1 . The LR-AKE protocol, described in Fig. 1 , can be considered a two-party password-based AKE involving a client-server pair where the server is one out of n − 1 possible servers. The client, C, remembers a chosen password, pw, and stores n − 1 secret values, h i (i = 1, . . . , n − 1), derived from pw in C's device. A partial secret value, h p(i).λi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 (not a share) of pw, is registered with each of the n − 1 servers. This will enable C to establish a session key with any of these servers in subsequent sessions. The underlined values in Fig.  1 represent the stored secrets of the respective client and server. Note that we only present sufficient details to understand this paper and we refer interested reader to [7] for further details.
C The client with identity IDC Si The i th server with identity IDS i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) G Finite cyclic group of large prime order q g, h Generators of G ri A random value in (Z/qZ) * pw The password chosen by the client p(·) Random polynomial of degree n − 1 with coefficients also randomly chosen in (Z/qZ) * ; defined as p(x) = Σ n−1 j=0 αj · x j mod q for which α0 = pw h p(i).λ i The secret value registered by client with server Si, where p(i) is a share of (n, n)-threshold secret sharing and λi is a Lagrange coefficient. Note that h −p(i).λ i = hi · h −pw , which allows for both client and server to compute the same MAC keys kmc and kms, respectively. hi Client's stored secret corresponding to server Si; equals h Σ n l=1,l =i p(l).λ l T agc, T ags,T ag sk Pre-determined distinct values, e.g., T agc = (IDC||IDS||00), T ags = (IDC||IDS||01) and T ag sk = (IDC||IDS||11) M AC k (·) A MAC generation function with k as its keying material Table 1 . Summary of notations
then sks ← M AC kms (T ag sk ||y1||y2).
Fig. 1.
Original LR-AKE protocol of Shin, Kobara, and Imai [7] Shin et al. proved the LR-AKE protocol secure against off-line dictionary attacks even if the stored secrets are leaked from either the client or up to all n−1 servers, but not from both client and n − 1 servers simultaneously [7, Theorem 1] .
Refining the oracle for leakage resilience
We now revisit the BPR2000 model used by Shin et al. to prove the security of the LR-AKE protocol.
Protocol participants. Let ID def = Clients ∪ Servers be a non-empty set of protocol participants, or principals. We assume Servers consists of n − 1 servers, {S 1 , . . . , S n−1 } and at any time a client C ∈ Clients is interacting with a server S i ∈ Servers to establish an LR-AKE session.
Protocol execution. The adversary, A, controls the communications between the protocol participants by interacting with the set of oracles, Π i Uu,Uv , where Π i Uu,Uv is defined to be the i th instantiation of a protocol participant, U u , in a specific protocol run and U v is the principal with whom U u wishes to establish a secret key. A controls the communication channels via the queries to the targeted oracles. A description of the oracle types is presented as follows. Note that we had split the Leak oracle into LeakC and LeakS oracles as this will allow us to distinguish whether the leakage occurs at the client or at the server.
Send(U u , U v , i, m) query. This query to an oracle, Π i Uu,Uv , computes a response according to the protocol specification and decision on whether to accept or reject yet, and returns them to the adversary A. If Π i Uu,Uv has either accepted with some session key or terminated, this will be made known to A. Note that if m = * , then this will result in the instantiation of the oracle Π Uu,Uv has accepted and holds some session key, will send this session key back to A. The Reveal query is designed to capture this notion. Corrupt(U u ) query. This query captures unknown key share attacks and insider attacks. This query allows A to corrupt the principal U u at will, and thereby learn the complete internal state of the corrupted principal. Notice that a Corrupt query does not result in the release of the session keys since A already has the ability to obtain session keys through Reveal queries. LeakC(ℓ, ) query. This query allows A to learn ℓ (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n − 1) stored secrets h ι of the client oracle and the corresponding indices ι (for ι ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, ι = ) of the leaked secrets. LeakS(t, ι) query. This query to a server oracle, U v , returns the corresponding stored secrets h p().λ of any t (1 ≤ t ≤ n−1) servers and their corresponding indices  (for  ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1},  = ι) of these leaked servers.
Protocol security. Security of the LR-AKE protocol [7] is defined in two stages.
1. Proving that the protocol is secure even when the stored secrets are leaked. 2. The standard indistinguishability-based security proof (of the established session key) as required by the BPR2000 model [1] .
A revised security proof for the LR-AKE protocol, presented in Appendix A, demonstrates that the LR-AKE protocol described in Fig. 1 provides both key establishment and mutual authentication.
Strengthened notions of leakage resilience and traceability
Shin et al. [7, 9] state that one cannot achieve security when there are leakages from both the client and server(s) side (see Fact 2) , the situation in which they call perfect security (see Goal 1).
Goal 1: Perfect Security [7, 9] . Any AKE protocol with 'perfect security' remains secure against leakages from client and server(s), simultaneously.
Fact 2. Impossibility of Perfect Security [7, 9] . Any AKE protocol cannot achieve (strong) security against leakage from both a client and servers simultaneously. If an adversary obtains stored secrets from both a client and servers at the same time, s/he can perfectly simulate the protocol using the leaked secrets. Thus s/he can try the password candidates off-line in parallel.
Shin et al. then argue that the next highest achievable goal is the security of the password against offline dictionary attacks even in the situation when there are "leakages" from either the client or the server(s) (see Goal 2 below).
Goal 2: Strong Security [7, 9] . In absence of 'perfect security', [7, 9] claim that the next highest goal is to achieve so-called 'strong security', i.e. security against the "leakages" from a client and servers, respectively.
We can view 'perfect security' described in Goal 1 as security against leakages from both the client and the server(s), while 'strong security' described in Goal 2 as security against leakages from either the client or the server(s). We argue that their requirement is too strong, i.e., unnecessarily restrictive as Goal 2 is not the next best security in the absence of Goal 1. We can still have security against leakages from both the client and server(s) with some trade-off.
Relation between the LR-AKE protocol and an (n, n) secret-sharing scheme
The reader might have observed that in the LR-AKE scheme, the n shares of the secret password pw are not separated uniformly among the n − 1 servers and the client. Therefore, leakage from a client should not be treated in the same way as leakage from a server -leakage of a stored secret from any server contains information about just one share whilst leakage from the client constitutes the entire stored secret, h i . It should come as no surprise that the LR-AKE protocol will be insecure if there are leakages from the client (i.e., n − 1 shares are leaked) and one or more servers.
We can, however, relax this strong requirement to achieve perfect security to a certain extent. We termed this as almost perfect security, which can be formalized by splitting the Leak queries (as described in Section 3). By having a separate LeakC query for the client oracle and a separate LeakS query for the server oracle, we are able to formally state:
1. whether the leakage is from the client or the server, and 2. how many stored secrets are leaked.
Making the former explicit is useful because leakages from a server contain only information about a particular share, while leakage from a client contains information about n − 1 shares. Making the latter explicit is also useful because by knowing which client's stored secret has been compromised, we will know the corresponding compromise at the server(s). Consequently, this allows us to show that the original LR-AKE protocol proposed in [7] can achieve a stronger notion of leakage resilience (in the sense of 'almost perfect security' as described in Goal 3). Goal 3. Almost Perfect Security. Any AKE protocol with 'almost perfect security' remains secure even against leakages from both the client and up to n−2 servers, simultaneously.
Since Goal 1 trivially implies Goal 3 and Goal 3 is a stronger notion than Goal 2, we now have the following result.
Theorem 1
The LR-AKE protocol achieves Goal 3 (almost perfect security) even when both the client and up to n− 2 servers leak their corresponding stored secrets, as long as the leaked secret(s) h ι of the client and leaked secret(s) of the server(s) S  are such that  = ι.
Proof Intuition. Recall that:
-a LeakC(ℓ, ) query allows the adversary A to learn ℓ (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n − 1) stored secrets h ι of the Client, and the corresponding indices ι (for ι ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}) of these leaked secrets, thus as long as the LeakS queries are issued only to servers S  for  = ι, there are insufficient shares (since number of leaked shares < n) to reveal the shared secret pw. -a LeakS(t, ι) query allows the adversary A to learn t (1 ≤  ≤ n − 1) stored secrets h p().λ of t Servers S  , and the corresponding indices  (for  ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}) of these leaked servers, thus as long as the LeakC query returns only stored secrets h ι of the client such that ι = , there insufficient shares to reveal the shared secret pw.
⊓ ⊔ Although we cannot prove the protocol secure when leakages originate from both the client and all servers, we can prove that the protocol remains secure when the leakages originate from the client and up to n − 2 servers, even in the case when the client leaks more than one (up to n − 2) secret(s). The conditions necessary for achieving Goal 3 is that the total of the stored secrets leaked by the client and the servers cannot exceed n − 1, and all their indices are different. Consequently, we can view Goal 3 as a special case of Goal 1 in the sense that we can still maintain security when we have leakages from both the client and the server(s) simultaneously.
Traceability. In our setting, the stored secrets can be leaked from either the client or server(s), or both. Although it is hard to prevent such leakages, the client would most likely to be interested to know which particular stored secret has been leaked. This is similar to the copyright violator identification and dispute resolution (arbitration) scenario (e.g., in buyer-seller protocols [6] ). This allows us to handle cases where leakages are unavoidable, but future preventive measures can be taken by firstly identifying the compromised client or server devices.
In the context of the LR-AKE schemes, we should be able to determine the compromised site (i.e., which particular server) since every registered stored secret is unique. Consequently, we are able to demonstrate that the original LR-AKE scheme provides traceability (i.e., in the event of leakages that compromise the security of the password, it is possible to precisely pinpoint which server(s) leaked). For example, when a password has been compromised, we know that it is likely that the compromise is at the client site (except with negligible probability). We can, therefore, trace which particular server(s) had caused the leakage by simply checking which stored secret(s) of the client, h i , is (are) leaked.
It appears that the original LR-AKE protocol [7] is the only scheme in their family that provides such a (traceability) feature as in the other variants (e.g., [8] [9] [10] ), the Client stores only one secret instead of unique ones corresponding to each server in the case of [7] . 
A Revised Security Proof
We now provide a sketch of the revised security proof demonstrating that the LR-AKE protocol provides both key establishment and mutual authentication.
Theorem 2 The LR-AKE protocol is a secure mutual authentication and key establishment (MAKE) protocol if the underlying message authentication (MAC) scheme is secure in the sense of existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attack assuming the intractability of the DDH Problem.
Proof. [9, Theorem 2], our F can do the same although the converse is not true. Recall that the SIDs of A and B for the protocol described in Fig. 1 are defined to be y 1 ||y 2 ||v 1 ||v 2 . Let Repeat be the event that a value of SID repeats at some point during the game simulation. It is easy to see that the probability of Repeat happening occurs with probability upper bounded by ⊓ ⊔ We now prove that the LR-AKE protocol achieves mutual authentication.
We define as Event
No−Matching the event that a fresh oracle, Π i U , who has been engaged in a conversation and has successfully finished the protocol with a session key output but without a partner oracle [1] .
Lemma 1
The LR-AKE protocol of Shin et al. [7] described in Fig. 1 Proof. Assume that an adversary can violate the mutual authentication with probability ǫ within a time bound t. Similar to our earlier proof, we construct a MAC forger, F , using such an adversary, A. F now simulates the view of such an adversary, A, in similar fashion as the earlier game simulation. We consider the probability that F does not abort the simulation, which can happen under any of the scenarios: (1) abort when being asked some Reveal queries (2) abort when being asked some LeakC queries (3) abort when being asked some LeakS queries (4) abort when being asked some Corrupt queries. Let q N be the maximum number of sessions between any two parties in the protocol run and q P be the maximum number of players in the protocol run.
The probability that F does not abort for scenarios (1) to (3) are (q 2 P q N − 2)/(q 2 P q N ) respectively, and for (4) is (q P −2)/(q 2 P ). One may further remark that the simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from a real game, except for a negligible probability. The probability for an oracle to have many partners is bounded by q 2 P /q N . Therefore, if F is successful during the simulation (the probability is at least ǫ), then there is a completed/accepted oracle Π i U such that Π i U has no matching oracle. Since there are at most q 2 P q N oracles during the simulation, the probability for this oracle to be the oracle, Π i U0 , is 1/(q 2 P q N ). Therefore, the advantage of F is at least ǫ(2 2 k − 1)(q P − 2)((q ). However, we know that both q N and q P are polynomial in the security parameter k. Hence, the probability of Pr[Event No−Matching ] is negligible if the MAC is secure.
⊓ ⊔
